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Methodological Pluralism and Ecological Economics 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Methodological pluralism advocates balanced consideration of multiple research 
methods. The concept rests upon the necessity of choice in the absence of conclusive 
principles to guide the preference of method. Ecological economics, however, has a 
coherent theory crafted along its biophysical worldview and moral commitments. 
These imperatives guide the choice of method and favour a reduced range of 
methodological possibilities to the exclusion of neoclassical economic options. If 
ecological economics is seen as an ideological opposite of  neoclassical economics, it 
would require a selective methodological strategy rather than maintaining 
methodological diversity. Maintaining diversity may erode the basis of its heterodox 
criticisms by requiring openness to the orthodox alternatives. Ecological economics 
has shown difficulty in sustaining its long-standing pluralist commitments while 
increasingly seeking clear differentiation from its monolithic “enemy”.  
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1. Introduction 
Since its inception ecological economics (EE) has been treated as a synthesis of 
multiple knowledge systems (Martinez-Alier 1987, Costanza and Daly 1987) in line 
with the emerging model of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994, Müller 
2003, Spash and Ryan forthcoming). Over the years many definitions and formal 
methodological structures have been proposed in an effort to forge a concrete 
disciplinary identity. There has been modification of definitive perspectives in the 
search of theoretical coherence. One example is concerned about the disciplinary 
recognition of and tolerance to competing theories about the ecological economy.   
Within the field there is a shared belief that the multiple ways of understanding 
are incongruent. Norgaard (1994, p. 96) doubted that “our multiple ways of 
understanding different aspects of ecosystems can be merged into one coherent view”. 
The reason is that the multiple incomparable models of knowledge production have 
meaning only in the context of their respective models. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile 
to pursue interpretative consensus and engage in shared problem-solving processes. 
This is the ultimate goal of EE, which is defined as “an effort to hasten a particular 
merger by pushing ecological understanding towards economics, and economic 
understanding towards ecology” (Norgaard 2003a, p. 1). Historically, scientific 
advancements have benefited from strengthened methodological disciplines. The 
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“particular merger” seems to be undergoing a similar endeavour; it is tempting to 
strive for theoretical coherence, yet sometimes at the expense of pluralism. 
Pluralism embodies the absence of an a priori rejection of ideas (Bigo and 
Negru 2008). Initially, EE was intended to be pluralistic, or moderately eclectic. 
Neither is it associated with a single methodology (Common 1995), nor seen as an 
alternative to any of the existing disciplines (Costanza et al. 1997a). Coexistence of 
competing paradigms and the legitimacy of expressing progressivist ideas were 
recognized in the pluralistic process of knowledge production (Maxwell and Randall 
1989). Some mainstream economic ideas gained recognition from prominent 
ecological economists, such as tradable birth rights (Daly 1991) and monetization of 
Nature’s services (Costanza et al. 1997b). The discipline was amenable to the 
principle of methodological pluralism (Norgaard 1989), and not deemed to be in a 
dichotomous relationship with its mainstream counterparts (Røpke 2005).   
This theoretical openness, however, is called into question in the wake of the 
social turn of EE (Spash 2011). The discipline is envisaged as a rival of neoclassical 
economics (Waring 2010, Pelletier 2010), and unlimited use of multiple 
methodologies is questioned (Spash 2012, Baumgärtner et al. 2008). Surveys show 
that monetary valuation studies, in particular, have received intense criticisms from 
the EE community (Illge and Schwarze 2009). Yet, the hostility to neoclassical 
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economics seems to ignore the fact that it represents a different set of values that may 
have moral legitimacy. For this reason Müller (2003) raises the concern that the open 
inter-disciplinary dialogues required by post-normal science are prematurely closed 
down by the belief that the ideas of EE are necessarily true whereas those of the 
neoclassical are not. EE may end up running in the direction of a normal science – not 
by accepting everything from mainstream economics, but precisely by doing 
everything exactly in the opposite way.    
In creating a coherent theory the role of methodological pluralism requires 
reconsideration. A methodology involves a body of practices, procedures and rules 
used by those who work in a discipline or engage in an inquiry. Scientists rely upon 
methodologies to examine research hypotheses or to reach inductive conclusions.  
Methodological pluralism refers to the advocacy of the use of a range of 
methodologies for scientific inquiry and is justified by the absence of meta-principles 
for the choice of method (Dow 1997, Samuels 1997). The concept, however, may be 
incompatible with the imperatives of EE (Spash 2012, Lo, Ryan and Spash 2010). 
Methodological pluralism has been a fundamental principle of EE since 
Norgaard’s (1989) seminal article explicating its significance in advancing 
sustainability research. According to Norgaard (1989), contemporary societies are 
confronted with ecological challenges that are fraught with uncertainties and 
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complexities. Considerable system variability and instability makes no single way of 
knowing compelling or sufficient. Multiple insights are required to cope with 
unpredictable environmental changes and guard against mistaken actions resulting 
from single perspective. Conscious maintenance of methodological diversity is crucial 
to enhancing adaptive capacity. 
In EE, a seemingly similar concept “pluralism as a methodology” has recently 
gained prominence. Pluralism as a methodology refers to particular approaches which 
recognise that environmental issues can have plural and incommensurable values.  
Examples include multicriteria analysis and deliberative valuation. Along with this 
trend is the suspicion about the value-monistic methodology of neoclassical 
economics, exemplified by cost-benefit analysis (CBA). However, methodological 
pluralism precludes rejection of such methodology in a priori. To argue otherwise 
requires some meta-principle to define a methodological strategy. Tension may arise 
when the pluralistic approaches are justified by a unifying meta-principle, which 
entails a selective methodological strategy privileging a particular group of research 
methods, such as multicriteria analysis, and marginalizing others, such as CBA. 
Addressing value pluralism has better prospects within a well-defined cluster of 
methodologies rather than an all-encompassing domain.  
Within the field of EE there actually is resistance in theory and practice to the 
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idea of methodological pluralism despite rhetorical use being made of. Spash (2012, 
p. 36), for example, rejects “the form of methodological pluralism which has been 
advocated since the start of this journal [Ecological Economics]”. He argues that 
unstructured methodological pluralism is the antithesis of creating knowledge and 
understanding within EE, which is in “ideological opposition” to the neoclassical 
economic schools of thought. The sceptical view coincides with the isolationist 
tendency of heterodox economics, in which pluralism is actually seen as a secondary 
priority and honoured only insofar as it does not conflict with its ideological 
preference (Garnett, 2006).  
These concerns warrant clarifications about the justifications of methodological 
pluralism. The principle of pluralism, as understood by Norgaard (1994, p. 96), is 
predicated upon the incommensurability of multiple knowledge models. The 
reasoning is that contradictions between models which do not fit into a single account 
preclude reliance on a single methodology for dealing with multiple problems. I argue 
that, however, the mere lack of comparability between models and data sets does not 
warrant the virtues of pluralism. Irreducible conflicts between alternatives do not 
prevent making a choice between them. An alternative could be selected based on 
some pre-determined criteria, by which knowledge of differences would only make 
the choice easier. If we are uncertain that, for example, continued material growth is 
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impossible, then any model of growth that affirms such a possibility should be 
rejected; in that case, the more differences between these models we acknowledge, the 
stronger the reason not to consider the other one. Certainty in our preference allows a 
choice to be made between alternatives, regardless of their differences. This is not 
precluded by failures to make comparison in a meaningful way. An analogy is that 
multilingual broadcast creates confusion to those who can only speak English – 
making different languages available to them is unnecessary if not problematic. The 
incongruity or incommensurability of models is not a sufficient condition for 
pluralism.   
The incongruity argument therefore cannot explain why methodological 
pluralism is rejected precisely because of the irreducible conflicts between 
neoclassical economics and EE in ontological and epistemological terms (e.g. Spash, 
2012). Norgaard (1989) fails to explicitly recognize the sufficient condition for 
pluralism, i.e. the inconclusivity of methodological merits. Instead, pluralism is 
couched in terms of acceptance of multiple insights (Norgaard, 1994, p. 97). Such an 
all-encompassing approach is not consistent with the claim that EE is 
methodologically distinctive from neoclassical economics. Likewise, Tietenberg and 
Lewis (2010) believe that EE is methodologically pluralist but competing with the 
neoclassical. What has been ignored is that the rival relationship would eventually 
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discourage non-rhetorical advocacy of pluralism within the discipline, raising 
questions about the compatibility of this concept with EE.  
The present paper aims to clarify the concept of methodological pluralism and 
elucidate the case against it. Being an “ideological opposition” to the neoclassical 
tradition, EE is not amenable to a strong form of pluralism1. Pluralism is about 
various monistic approaches and does not offer an argument against individual 
approaches. This paper provides explanations, beginning by unpacking the theory of 
methodological pluralism, followed by a discussion on its incompatibilities with the 
shared aspirations of ecological economists.  
 
2. The Concept of Methodological Pluralism 
Plurality refers to the existence of a range of perspectives concerning a given issue 
which might be incompatible with each other. Pluralism is a normative principle that 
allows for an appreciation of plurality and provides an approach to settle the issue of 
plurality by clarifying the relationship between the different perspectives. The degree 
of pluralism is higher when the theories in question are substitutes than if they are 
complements (Mäki, 1997); it increases with the lack of a common ontological and 
epistemological framework.  
Unlike “pluralism as a methodology”, methodological pluralism is a meta-
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methodological position, providing a set of normative rules for the assessment of 
methodological positions (Dow 1997, 2004, 2011). At the core is a disposition to  
non-rejection of diverse positions, rather than an inclination to accept all of them. 
According to Samuels (1997), methodological pluralism 1) affirms either that there 
are no methodological or epistemological absolutes or that no such absolutes have 
been demonstrated unequivocally; 2) rejects any a priori exclusivist attempts that 
seek to establish a single methodology as unequivocally superior or to give a 
privileged position; 3) does not deny the usefulness of any one position constituting 
an antinomy; and 4) maintains that no position can be conclusively disregarded on a 
priori grounds. Methodological pluralists accentuate the argument of methodological 
inconclusivity. 
A position that contrasts methodological pluralism is methodological 
exclusivism, which holds that there exists just one proper method for inquiry (Roth 
1987). This concept presupposes one set of credentials as necessarily a priori superior 
to another. Methodological exclusivists adopt a single unequivocal, conclusive meta-
principle by which to decide acceptance of epistemology and methodology. 
Methodological exclusivism has been championed by those who celebrate a unity of 
method between the natural and social sciences. In contrast, pure methodological 
pluralism entails a rejection of any unity-of-method thesis (Roth, 1987).  
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The underlying reasoning behind holding a methodological pluralism position is 
self-insufficiency of individual theories. Each system of knowledge captures only a 
partial view of reality (Dow 1996). Since knowledge is in general held with 
uncertainty, there is no single conclusive basis for identifying the best way of building 
knowledge (Dow, 2004). The necessity of methodological pluralism decreases with 
the capability of distinguishing good theories from bad ones (Caldwell, 1989). The 
more capable the scientists are of identifying conclusive criteria of assessment, the 
more limited set of theories they could and would adhere to. Should they be 
successful, eventually a single theory would be sufficient. “Assessment would be a 
straightforward matter; if a methodology accorded with the criteria, accept it; if not, 
reject it” (Caldwell 1989, p. 44). Certainty about the validity or legitimacy of theories 
renders methodological exclusivism more compelling than pluralism. 
Among these pluralists there are nuanced views about the notion of certainty. 
The definition by Samuels (1997) is grounded on the ethical argument that irreducible 
diversity should be maximally tolerated and every set of methodological credentials 
be recognized. For Samuels (1997), “pluralism at all levels is the key” (Caldwell 
1997, p. 102). Caldwell (1982, 1989) proposes a less eclectic alternative called 
“critical pluralism”, where methodological pluralism is understood as “instrumentally 
good” by capturing a range of theories for evaluation. Since it may be associated with 
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“some bad results” such as anarchism, criticisms in the methodology’s own terms are 
essential to combat the deficiencies, through which “some methodological views are 
shown to be better than others, and the number of competing positions is reduced” 
(Caldwell, 1989, p. 45). Dow (1997, p. 95) is critical of Caldwell’s account as the 
latter “appears to regard a wide plurality of methodologies as a regrettable necessity, 
and looks forward to the outcome of methodological pluralism as being a narrowing-
down of possibilities”.  
The idea that the total set of methodological choice can ultimately be reduced to 
a narrower set pertains to a closed-system epistemology. According to this view, there 
is a hierarchy of theory and the task for researchers is to clarify it through inspection 
of a broader set. However, justifications for methodological pluralism become unclear 
when it is subtly associated with a unitary epistemology and/or ontology (Dow, 1997). 
Dow (1997, 2004) is convinced that a pluralist epistemology is essential as certainty 
of knowledge is inherently unattainable and each methodologist interprets the 
uncertain parts and tells their own “story” from subjective experience. When the 
understanding of reality is construed as being socially constructed and value-laden, no 
criteria of assessment can be universally accepted. If an objective truth could be 
demonstrated, only the method by which it is validated would be needed to advance 
the science 2 . Otherwise invalidated subjective judgements entail balanced 
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consideration of multiple methodologies.  
None of the named methodological pluralists accepts an “anything goes” 
approach. The thrust is to encourage scholars to recognize alternative methodological 
credentials and make their own studied determinations as to which set of credentials 
to accept and within what limits (Samuels, 1997). Dow (1997) is particularly 
concerned about the possible outcome of methodological anarchy, noting that 
unstructured forms of methodological pluralism imply an unproductive “non-
methodology” position where no scientific discourse could be considered tenable. 
Dow (2004) insists that constraints are needed and proposes the idea of “structured 
pluralism”, which is based on a pluralist epistemology but does not accept the range 
of methodological approaches as infinite.  
Mere recognition of differences is not a sufficient condition of methodological 
pluralism. Awareness of incompatible features does not automatically lead to 
affirmation of plurality; it is compatible with and indeed required for justifying 
considered exclusion of alternative positions. Ecological economists aspire to merge 
economics and ecology, and increasingly demand for theoretical coherence within the 
field. The endeavour is guided by a set of meta-principles by which the merits of 
various methodologies could be determined. While their arguments indicate the 
distinctive elements of EE, they are actually compatible with a diminishing range of 
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methodological possibilities. 
 
3. The Methodological Preference of Ecological Economics 
Integrating knowledge requires the ability to decide on the validity and legitimacy of 
theories and methodologies. Only when diversity is deemed to be an impediment to 
knowledge advancement or collective action is integration a relevant issue. Faber 
(2008), concurring Røpke (2005), worries that the field is not well structured and 
fragile, and its identity is weak. The lack of coherence remains a concern to Waring 
(2010) and Spash (2012), among others. There is a growing interest in enhancing 
theoretical coherence and sharpening disciplinary identity by demarcating from 
alternative economic traditions, notably neoclassical economics. 
 
3.1 Resistance to methodological pluralism 
Diverse ways of defining research problems can lead to incongruity, which is 
conceived as a major impediment for the field: “Persistent disagreement both as to the 
interpretation to be given to sustainability, and as to the relation between ecological 
and economic sustainability, has hindered the development of an ecological 
economics” (Common and Perrings 1992, p. 7). To Norgaard (2004), fragmentation of 
knowledge is a regrettable reality of the current science, hampering prospects for 
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collective action. He posits that EE is devoted to aggregating the fragmented 
understandings of complex problem across disciplinary confines into a coherent, 
shared set which brings scientists closer to reality. The science involves the art of 
weaving pieces into a bigger picture within a yet-to-be-recognized frame. Such a 
perspective portrays methodological pluralism as being a means to an end.  While the 
absence of conclusive meta-principles of scientific practice is a premise of 
maintaining methodological plurality, adherence to the requirements of 
methodological pluralism can become a barrier to the integration of straddled fields.   
Concerns have been raised as to the possible outcomes of methodological 
anarchy. There is support for a unity of science under the scope of the biophysical 
economy.  Martinez-Alier (1987, p. 211), for example, endorses Otto Neurath’s 
proposal for a unified science, which involves “elimination and overcoming of 
contradictions between the propositions of difference sciences”. Irreducible conflicts 
between research methods are alluded to but avoided: “Neurath believed in a strict 
unity of method, but this question can be left aside” (Martinez-Alier 1987, p. 207).  
Baumgärtner et al. (2008, p. 391) unambiguously state that methodological 
pluralism “requires a unified basis”, as the otherwise unfocused framework might 
result in an “unconditional and arbitrary openness” confusing the selection of method. 
A “general and unifying methodology” is proposed “to develop a common basic 
 16
construction of the world”, through the application of generic modelling to individual 
cases (Baumgärtner et al. 2008, p. 388-389, see also Baumgärtner and Quaas 2009). 
Baumgärtner et al. (2008, p. 391) believe that their proposal is able to provide “a 
meta-methodological criterion of how to do EE”, and “can serve as guidance…for 
every individual contribution to EE”. The purpose of inter-disciplinary research is 
understood as to link up various research traditions to form a coherent whole with 
greater problem-solving capacity. The heterogeneity of method is to be reduced in 
search of coherence.   
Likewise, Venkatachalam (2007, p. 556) complains that the scope of EE has 
been “too vast”, “focusing on too many areas”, and that the ideological divide 
between disciplines has made “hurdles for inter-disciplinary research”. Behavioural 
and experimental economics are identified as a unifying basis for EE to realize a 
“convergence in the theoretical frameworks” (Venkatachalam 2007, p. 552) that could 
then be applied to an incredibly wide range of applied topics, from resource 
allocation, economic valuation, the role of technology, population, ethics, to the 
maintenance of capital stock. Venkatachalam (2007, p. 556) believes that EE should 
strive, but has so far failed, to provide such a “widely accepted theoretical 
framework”.  
Methodological pluralism has been regarded as a barrier to knowledge 
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advancement. As suggested by Waring (2010, p. 719):  
ecological economics seems to be casting the net too wide……It is not that 
pluralism per se is damaging, but rather that science depends on having both 
a subject matter and consistent means of addressing it. 
In a similar vein, Spash (2012) argues that uncritical pluralism creates contradictions 
within the field. Methodological pluralists “must either indiscriminately accept 
everything” at the expense of knowledge coherence, or accept some grounds for 
rejecting objectionable ideas (Spash, 2012, p. 41) 3 . He is convinced that the 
“incompatible orthodox [economics]” has to be excluded to move ahead with 
alternative theories and practice, and there is a clear need to jettison the current form 
of methodological pluralism. Not all differences are tolerated within the frame of a 
pluralist methodology (Spash, 2011). His recognition of pluralism is preceded by 
expelling the orthodoxy and neoliberal ideas. 
These ecological economists recognize the fact of plurality, but not a permanent 
place for methodological pluralism. Underlying this view are predispositions to an 
alternative worldview and associated ethical imperatives, by which methodologies can 
either be accepted or rejected conclusively, both violating the principle of pluralism.  
 
3.2 Demarcation criteria defining the scope for pluralism 
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Ecological economists generally share a biophysical conception of economy and a 
moral commitment to long-term sustainability and inter-generational equity. There is 
a firm belief that the economy is embedded into the ecosystems and human activity 
should not exceed the carrying capacity of the earth or the well-beings of future 
generations would be compromised. The shared worldview and commitments 
manifest as a set of “demarcation criteria” (Garnett, 2006, p. 531) which favour 
engagement with a limited range of methodologies. 
The study of EE was initiated by a group of concerned scholars aspiring to draw 
economists’ attention to the role of the entropic and other related concepts (Røpke, 
2005). Its scientific foundations are couched in terms of energy and material flows. 
The environment-economy relationship is interpreted in ways that the laws of energy 
and matter allow. The discipline is characterized by a cross-disciplinary application of 
concepts and beliefs like the laws of thermodynamics, ecological resilience, 
irreversibilities in production, non-linear equilibrium, and limited substitutability of 
goods, etc (Costanza 1991, Costanza et al. 1997a, Daly and Townsend 1993, Perrings 
1997). These presuppositions constitute what Özkaynak et al. (2001, p. 3) called “a 
consensus in the ecological economics literature about how the world works”. 
Herman Daly’s (e.g. 1987, 1996, 1999) contributions were particularly 
influential suggesting that even a seemingly healthy modern economy has biophysical 
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limits. In search of a shared perception of an ultimate end, however, Daly has 
distanced himself from the “modern devotees of pluralism”, when he avers that “we 
must have a dogmatic belief in objective value, an objective hierarchy of ends ordered 
with reference to some concept of the ultimate end” in favour of “subjective opinions” 
(Daly and Farley 2011, p. 43). Daly’s “dogmatic belief” indicates a closed-system 
epistemology (Dow, 1997, 2004) by which what should be included in analysis and 
how can be determined. 
This macro-ecological perspective affirms the possibility of unifying principles 
(Pelletier 2010). Conceptual grounds for a unifying science are based upon an 
“ecologized” view of the economy. The realities outlined by this view, called “second 
law realities” (Rees 2003, p. 36), which refer to the second law of thermodynamics, or 
entropy law, are regarded as the single most important foundation for the field striving 
for coherence. The “dogmatic belief” in the biophysical realities entails a radical form 
of economic restructuring, i.e. steady-ready economy (Daly, 1996), or even de-
growth, which is seen as a “necessity” (Klitgaard and Krall in press, p. 5). Alternative 
conceptions of the economy are not part of the unifying project.       
In conformity to these assumptions, EE is committed to developing a common 
analytic framework in which the embeddedness of human economy in the geo-
biosphere of the Earth is recognized (Faber, Manstetten and Proops 1996, Proops 
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1989, Røpke 2005). According to Faber et al. (1996), EE is an interdisciplinary 
inquiry providing a “forum”, or a space for theorizing human-natural interactions in 
various terms. They suggest that the growing interest in the entropic foundations “has 
encouraged the opening up of world views” (Faber et al., 1996, p. 10 and 14). Yet this 
“forum” remains open up to a point, which is confined to the “same concepts” in their 
ecological discourse, e.g. the entropy concepts. These concepts enable ecological 
economists “to use one language to speak on problems of both economy and ecology” 
for the reformulation of economic theory, with “teleology as a unifying approach to 
natural and social phenomena” (Faber et al., 1996, p. 169). The use of multiple 
“languages”, such as the neoclassical market theory, should then be discouraged. The 
“forum” operates in the presence of shared terms of reference. 
The outcome is an ideological tendency influencing the choice of methodologies 
This has been admitted by a group of founding ecological economists, including Daly 
and Norgaard, in a textbook on EE (Costanza et al., 1997a). In spite of their stated 
commitment to methodological pluralism, they note that although ecological 
economists are diverse, “the largest “cluster” works from the initial premise that the 
earth has a limited capacity for sustainably supporting people and their artifacts…” so 
that the textbook “pursues one dominant approach to the field” (Costanza et al., 
1997a, p. 75). In fact, there is an increasing proportion of formal and empirical 
 21
methods being used in EE research since 1989, suggesting the declining popularity of 
their alternatives (Silva and Teixeira 2011). The range of research methods actually 
adopted has not gone more diverse over time. 
Ecological economists address the social goals of intergenerational fairness and 
justice under the scope of the biophysical economy. Many of them are frustrated by 
the narrow focus of mainstream economics on anthropocentrism, methodological 
individualism, and technological optimism. As an alternative, EE is steered toward 
those theories of ethics benign to collective well-being. The theory of justice and 
political philosophy of John Rawls (1971, 1993) appear particularly attractive to 
ecological economists. David Pearce (1987) devoted a whole paper to defend the 
Rawlsian conception of justice as a foundation for EE. According to this theory, 
intergenerational ethics is interpreted in terms of an “original position”, where an 
individual would operate with no knowledge of her own individual status and interest 
in the society when she is going to make a decision regarding allocation of collective 
resources, that is, no knowledge of whether she would be advantaged or 
disadvantaged as a result. This idea of “veil of ignorance”, in effect, asks individuals 
to inhibit personal interest and think about every other current and future individual. 
Prominent ecological economists such as Costanza (1996, 2000), Daly (1987), 
Howarth (1995, 2007) and Norton (1989) have generally appeared positive to the 
 22
relevance of the work of Rawls.  
The influence of the Rawlsian concepts is evidenced in the debates on values 
and valuation methodology. In EE environmental values are analyzed at a social and 
institutional level. Howarth’s (2007) sustainability criterion is in part couched in 
Rawlsian terms. This approach to rights and entitlements is underlying his theory of 
deliberative monetary valuation (Howarth and Wilson 2006, Wilson and Howarth 
2002). Pelletier (2010) is not convinced by the Rawlsian approach. Alternatively, he 
advances a communitarian conception of justice as the ecological economic ethic 
which proceeds from an understanding of the economic actor as community member. 
In either case, a departure from self-interested orientations and methodological 
individualism is expected. 
To work within the Rawlsian or communitarian conception does not require a 
wide range of methodological possibilities. The Rawlsian theory of democracy deals 
with the challenge of value plurality by enforcing an institutional framework crafted 
with a liberal political values storyline (Rawls, 1993). An ideal outcome is 
convergence of plural values towards a particular end - a singular end. A 
methodological criterion can then be specified for EE by outranking impartial interest 
as a moral foundation. As such public value is no longer defined around the individual, 
there is no compelling reason to devise or employ methodologically individualistic 
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valuation techniques. Practitioners should then choose those research methods that 
can capture other-regarding rather than self-regarding values and interests, and 
facilitate collective rather than individual considerations.  
The substantive definition of subject matter means that the choice of method is 
far from inconclusive. When the subject matter of EE can be defined by an ever 
sharper social-individual dichotomy, the choice of method would become dependent 
upon which side of the dichotomy the researcher supports. Consequently the choice 
could only become more straightforward as a particular set of methodologies would 
prove consistently more attractive than others. Examples include the use of 
deliberative valuation techniques (Lo and Spash in press). Allowing an exclusive 
focus on impartial considerations has been suggested by Wilson and Howarth (2002) 
and Soma and Vatn (2010) as the justification for adopting deliberative approaches.  
For ecological economists, the type of uncertainty that justifies the use and study 
of plural methodologies is based on acknowledged ecological and ethical complexities, 
rather than the epistemological or methodological assumptions. The latter case in its 
purest form provides no conclusive criterion for assessment of theories or 
methodologies as explained in the previous sections, but the former is itself such a 
criterion. That is, the states of the human-nature dynamic are uncertain, making 
uncertainty-acknowledging research approaches necessary. The science is not entirely 
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uncertain as to whose expertise and values count (e.g. thermodynamics) or do not 
count (e.g. neoclassical theory of value). It is not inconclusive as to the merits of 
available methodologies.  
The vision of EE is largely shared among practitioners at an abstract level: “The 
first-priority policy question is a scientific one” (Peet 1992, p. 220), and 
environmental sustainability is a “priori”, “higher” value (Norgaard 2003b, p. 31). 
The product is a weak form of methodological pluralism grounded upon a hierarchy 
of theory. Although it is recognized that no single way of portraying the ecological 
economy is generally right (Norgaard 1989), there is a generally wrong one, i.e. the 
neoclassical way. 
 
3.3 Scepticism over neoclassical economics 
The widely shared physical and social criteria of EE support a compelling case for 
ruling out the methodologies permeating neoclassical economics. Full enforcement of 
these criteria would exert both upward and downward effects on the growth in the 
range of methodology. The former comes from the introduction of new research 
methods, such as ecological footprint assessment and multicriteria evaluation. The 
latter is evidenced by the general resistance by many EE practitioners to reductionist 
research approaches, notably CBA.  
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An exclusivist stance influencing the choice of methodologies is evidenced in 
many writings. For example, Common and Perrings (1992, p. 8) argues that “[a]n 
ethical shift away from the values that privilege consumer sovereignty” is vital. 
However, this is followed by an affirmation of just another hierarchy of theory that 
licenses for a transfer of the privilege to another category of value: “an ecological 
economics of sustainability implies an approach that privileges the requirements of 
the system above those of the individual” (Common and Perrings, 1992, p. 32).  
To account for systems uncertainties, non-reductionist approaches are advocated 
(Holt and Spash, 2009).  Ecological and neoclassical economics are then seen as a 
dichotomy because the latter is characterized by methodological reductionism (Douai 
2009). Advocates of EE who consistently argue for holism have to confront their 
neoclassical counterparts. Thus Douai (2009) rejects neoclassical economics and 
questions Martinez-Alier et al.’s (1998) position of “not against giving economic 
value”. There is little confidence in the mainstream: “the neoclassical paradigm and 
its value concept have to be given up” (Söllner 1997, p. 175). Divorce from the 
orthodox school is supported by Spash (2012, p. 46): “If people wish to undertake 
such [neoclassical] approaches they should do so elsewhere”. Ecological economists 
act as “paradigm warriors” (Garnett 2006, De Langhe 2010) in search of demarcation 
criteria that render EE distinct from and superior to neoclassical economics. 
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CBA is the definitive methodology of the orthodoxy under prolonged attack for 
the assumption of value commensurability, denial of the existence of inalienable 
rights, privileging consumer sovereignty, and contributing to distributional inequity 
(Söderbaum 2000, 2008, Spash 2008, Gowdy and Erickson 2005). Given these views, 
the role of CBA must be considerably limited.  As Bergström (1993) argues, CBA is 
defensible only in individual choice case. It is unsuitable for the case of strong 
sustainability invariably involving ethics and uncertainty (Munda 1996, Spash 2002). 
Ecological economists troubled by the omnipresence of CBA in economics are 
convinced that limitations on the choice of method are necessary. Peet (1992, p. 222) 
avers that CBA “is no longer seen as an appropriate methodology”, since it cannot 
achieve ends determined by ecology and ethics. More generally, “[t]he methodology 
of economic investigation is failing” (Spash, 2002, p. 198). The practitioner survey 
conducted by Illge and Schwarze (2009) has shown that the EE community is 
generally hostile to monetary valuation of the environment. 
While few ecological economists completely deny any role for CBA, many of 
them have a common understanding about the biophysical economy and share a 
hierarchy of theory. The shared, substantive ontological and epistemological premises 
define the range of methodologies allowed. On this basis, some methodological 
options are ruled out. Ruling out rival claims results in lowering heterogeneity. 
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Scepticism over the neoclassical economic theory has been followed by a preference 
for a narrower methodological spectrum. The clear resistance to the use of CBA, in 
particular, goes hand in hand with the rising concerns over the eclectic scope of 
methodological pluralism. In confronting with the neoclassical schools, ecological 
economists struggle to appreciate the virtues of methodological pluralism. The next 
section shows how some ecological economists struggle with this concept and how 
EE, as they define, is incompatible with it. 
 
4. The Challenges of Pluralism under Defined Preference  
4.1 Struggling on pluralism 
EE has a broader scope of analysis, but its normative premises are built upon a 
preanalytic vision diverging from neoclassical economics in significant aspects. The 
necessarily exclusive focus on these premises delimits the range of values admissible 
to EE research. For example, an ideological belief shared among ecological 
economists concerns the necessity of managing population growth and the scale of 
economic activity (Daly 1996, Spash 2012). EE is thus critical of any policy agenda in 
favour of continued material growth, which nevertheless has received general support 
from many people living in the global South and may be considered legitimate in 
consideration of their historical sufferings and distributional justice (Ikeme 2003). 
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The conservative commitments impose restrictions on the choice of research methods. 
The pluralist claim then becomes hard to sustain. 
The proposed marginalization of CBA alike indicates a belief that the field 
would be better served by a limited range of research methods. Individual research 
approaches, such as induction and deduction, or reductionism and holism, do not 
directly compete with the concept of methodological pluralism. Failures to understand 
the non-exclusive nature of pluralism result in inconsistencies and ambivalence 
among practitioners regarding the appropriate methodological strategy for EE. 
Costanza and Daly (1987, p. 7), for example, define EE as an attempt to effect “a true 
synthesis of economics and ecology”, which seems at odds with their latter view that 
it is “not a new single paradigm based in shared assumptions and theory” (Costanza et 
al., 1997a, p. 49). The question that how such a “true synthesis” could be achieved in 
the absence of converging beliefs remains unclear. Although the discipline is claimed 
to be deliberately conceptually pluralistic, it has been steered toward a holistic 
systems approach in preference to a reductionist one (Sahu and Choudhury 2005, 
Costanza et al. 1997a).  
Martinez-Alier (2005, p.35) concurs with this view by suggesting that 
“ecological economics, based on methodological pluralism (Norgaard, 1989), must 
not follow the reductionist road”. Yet, this is not only in conflict with his appreciation 
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of Otto Neurath who may be identified as a methodological exclusivist, but also self-
contradictory, because pluralism does not require repudiation of reductionist research 
approaches. Likewise, O’Neill (2004, 2007), in defending the methodological 
pluralist position of Neurath, rejects reductionist approaches. Neurath advocated an 
“orchestration of the sciences”, in which propositions which do not connect with the 
“general structure of laws” “have to disappear” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 211). 
Expelling alternatives (e.g. CBA) that are not attuned to the main rhythm is required 
to pursue a unity of science. In these studies, the advocacy of methodological 
pluralism is conditioned upon the existence and acceptance of a common framework 
for the choice of methods, rather than the absence of it. It is understood as an attempt 
at integration guided by defined principles, by which, however, exclusion of 
incompatible approaches is permitted. 
Value pluralism is an imperative of EE (Costanza et al. 1997a, Spash 2011). 
Ecological economists who are sympathetic to plural values tend to be suspicious of 
the mainstream economic methodology. Douai (2009, p. 274, original emphasis) 
contends that as far as Nature is concerned, there is no place for the neoclassical-
utilitarian conception: “the various modes of valuation of natural wealth relate to 
realms such as politics, ethics and aesthetics, and not to the economic realm”. This 
position fits oddly to his pledge to deal with “plural modes of human valuation” 
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(Douai, 2009, p. 262). A similarly self-contradictory claim is made by Pelletier (2010) 
arguing for rejection of the neoclassical economic account to achieve a plurality of 
objectives. The kind of plurality recognized by Douai (2009) and Pelletier (2010) 
does not acknowledge the fact that the neoclassical approach represents an alternative 
moral end supposed to be subsumed under a pluralist framework. There is a lack of 
understanding of pluralism as a meta-position that regulates the interaction of various 
positions. 
The calls for inter-disciplinary dialogues are not open to the orthodoxy and its 
methodologies. Söderbaum (2000, p. 214) argues that neoclassical economics should 
be actively debated and “issues related to values, ethics, and ideology should be 
discussed more often” in EE.  Yet he suggests one way to do this is “to exclude papers 
built on cost benefit analysis and so-called contingent valuation” (Söderbaum, 2000, 
p. 215), because “[a]s scholars we cannot suggest methods (cf. Cost–Benefit Analysis) 
that are incompatible with democracy” (Söderbaum 1999, p. 162). One may then 
wonder how much space would be left to the discussion in the absence of the 
defenders of CBA which happens to be a dominant type of what is meant to be 
discussed. Söderbaum (2000, 2008) has reiterated his recognition of the existence of 
multiple and competing ideological orientations, but only one of them, i.e. “radical 
interpretation of sustainable development”, is seen as the cornerstone of EE. Pluralism 
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is thus sought from within a single ideological domain, rather than across ideological 
divides.    
Silva and Teixeira (2011) define post-normal science in terms of multiplicity of 
methods and claim that it has been realized in the field of EE. However, their citation 
analysis indicates a research trend of empirical formalism, which is an initial sign of 
declining, rather than increasing, openness to different methodologies, coinciding 
with Sagoff’s (2011) observation. Changes in positions have also been observed. For 
instance, Spash’s (2012) rejection of methodological pluralism is preceded by a 
preference for it (Spash, 2009, p. 256). Pearce’s (1987) affirmation of Rawls’s theory 
of justice as a foundation of EE is slammed by his later claim that “non-economic 
approaches have failed” (Pearce 1998, p. 206).  
There are persistent struggles on formulating an appropriate methodological 
strategy for EE. Methodological pluralism does not fit squarely into the defined 
ambits of the field. Indeed, as I explain in the next section, diversity is a hindrance 
when coherence is needed to complete a theory. 
 
 
4.2 Methodological diversity as a problem  
The theoretical justifications for a strong form of methodological pluralism in EE are 
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not clear. The pluralist would refrain from consciously denying any of the existing 
economic methodologies on a priori grounds. If EE is the diagonal opposite of 
neoclassical economics, any relative methodological advantage it has must be a 
weakness of the other. Justifying the use of a research methodology for EE would 
mean downplaying its alternatives adopted by its neoclassical counterpart. The 
success of EE would then be negatively related to the popularity of neoclassical 
economic methodologies. It would eventually benefit from a diminishing range of 
methodological possibilities (e.g. by rejecting CBA), rather than an increasing one. 
This begs the question that if there is any room for the virtues of pluralism to flourish 
to the greatest extent.  
The answer seems to be negative. EE is defined by some researchers as 
competing with its neoclassical counterparts (Pelletier 2010, Sahu and Nayak 1994, 
Spash 2012). The identity of EE thus depends on its ability to demonstrate the 
fallacies of and its superiority over neoclassical economics. This strategy actually 
cannot make a consistent case for a methodologically pluralistic programme. At best, 
it is merely conducive to nurturing “antagonist pluralism” where no consensus is 
possible without some exclusion (De Langhe, 2010).  As Caldwell (1989) elucidates, 
if one is trying to demonstrate a methodological position to be wrong, one must have 
a replacement in hand. Attempts to sharpen the criticisms and make effective the 
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portrayal of a preferred alternative are best served by building arguments for a 
particular methodological approach rather than many. An otherwise eclectic position 
is futile to tell exactly what and why the incumbent should be rejected and why it’s 
alternative is better. Methodological diversity is a hindrance to launch an effective 
attack against rivals. 
As this logic goes, practicing methodological pluralism would make EE less 
competitive rather than more. An oppositional tradition is differentiated by not doing 
those things that its rival is doing. The most favourable strategy for EE is to downplay 
those approaches that do not attend to its biophysical and social arguments and to 
adopt holistic, pluralistic mode of inquiry exclusively. As the pluralistic approach 
becomes dominant whereas the reductionist, monistic one wanes, methodological 
diversity would eventually diminish. Indeed, the more compelling and successful this 
strategy is, the less the need to maintain a diversity. Ascending support for pluralism 
as a methodology does not guarantee pluralism at meta-methodological level.  
When diversity within discipline is in a minimum, the degree of differentiation 
from an internally coherent alternative is in a maximum. Promoting “niche 
diversification”, as celebrated by Sahu and Nayak (1994), therefore is unlikely to 
render promising the programme of methodological pluralism. If EE is to confront 
with neoclassical economics, it would need to sharpen its meta-methodological 
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position by excluding methodologies adopted by the alternative. Success of EE is in a 
negative relationship with the range of allowed methodological possibilities to the 
extent in which it is construed as an alternative to the orthodoxy. The obsessive 
concern among some ecological economists with the uniqueness and separateness of 
the discipline leads to an isolationist tendency. Consequently, they are doomed to be 
“paradigm warriors” who must be monists despite utilizing pluralism as a strategic 
sword (De Langhe 2010, Garnett 2006).  
 This tendency explains some of the self-contradictory claims discussed above 
and poses challenge to the “democratization” of the discipline. Many ecological 
economists are of the view that EE should be made more democratic and deliberative 
in order to deal with the plurality of values and the complexities of the human-
environment systems (Lo and Spash in press, Norgaard 2007, Söderbaum and Brown 
2010, Zografos and Howarth 2008). A democratizing economics would accommodate 
ideological pluralism and allow paradigm co-existence (Maxwell and Randall, 1989; 
Soderbaum and Brown, 2010). Neoclassical economics and its political variant 
neoliberalism have audience from the developing world and expressing these 
concerns in democratic debates is legitimate. If EE is firmly placed in ideological 
opposition to neoliberalism and the pro-growth movement (Martínez-Alier et al. 2010, 
Spash 2012, Waring 2010), it will lose capacity to deal with the diversity of existing 
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ideologies and accommodate paradigm co-existence. Such an antagonistic position 
precludes “reciprocal enrichment” that facilitates that understanding of complexity 
(Max-Neef 2005, p. 15). Democratizing economics would become a dubious attempt 
as rival theories are excluded in a priori. The “paradigm warriors” are no ideological 
democrats seeking to promote tolerance and critical engagement with their “enemies” 
(Garnett, 2006). 
  
5. Conclusions 
What makes methodological pluralism important is not simply that there are multiple 
incongruent methods for research, but that it is inconclusive as to what constitutes an 
appropriate methodology. The concept is given by the inconclusivity in determining 
the legitimacy or validity of various methodologies on a priori grounds. Arguments 
for any conclusive criterion for the choice of methods counteract the fundamental 
justifications of methodological pluralism. A conception of science compatible with 
researchers attempting to unify or downplay alternative methodologies ultimately 
provides little grounds to permanently maintaining a methodological plurality.  
Contrary to Spash (2012), I doubt that methodological pluralism has much value 
for EE not because it means everything could be accepted, but precisely the opposite, 
i.e. it effectively means nothing could be accepted. Generalized principles for the 
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choice of method are not absent from the field. The shared ontological and 
epistemological premises define its disciplinary uniqueness and allow demarcation 
from neoclassical economics. Consequently, a different selection of methods is 
favoured. Attempts at differentiation can be supported by affirmation or rejection of 
methodologies. Non-rejectionist disposition, which defines the concept of 
methodological pluralism, does not help.  
If EE is construed as a substitute to neoclassical economics, then its distinct 
identity and superiority would depend on a sharpening dichotomy with diminishing 
space for alternative methodologies. Strengthening theory is best served by promoting 
some sort of unity within disciplinary confines. This endeavour could gain more 
success by all practitioners adhering to a particular set of methodology, eventually 
reducing the range of methodological possibilities and hence the potential for 
pluralism. Advocating pluralism is a hindrance to differentiating from an alternative 
methodological tradition. A pluralist ethos can hardly flourish as ecological 
economists engage in such exclusionary campaign.  
Committed pluralist has no enemy. The opposite of a monistic ideological 
system is not a pluralistic one which accounts for competing ideologies, but another 
monistic system turning the theory of the other one upside down. Methodological 
pluralism is important to a research discipline being reluctant or unable to affirm the 
 37
validity and legitimacy of the methodological propositions of individual research 
traditions. Otherwise there would be less a need for maintaining methodological 
diversity. The opposite of the economic monist is no pluralist. 
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1 Nevertheless this does not mean that I believe that EE should be defined as the opposite of 
neoclassical economics, although a number of ecological economists lean toward this view. This paper 
does not argue for or against such dichotomous treatment, but merely suggests that it is inconsistent 
with the notion of methodological pluralism in the context of EE.   
2 Objective reality is believed to be a core element of the theory of EE. Spash (2012), for instance, 
affirms the notion of “critical realism”, which recognizes the inability to demonstrate discovery of 
objective truth, but does not reject the existence of an underlying objective reality. Yet the inability to 
provide objective proof precludes conclusive validation of the merits of subjective judgments. The 
unprovable knowledge of truth is incapable of falsifying subjective judgments on it. Verification of 
alternative claims to validity is then inherently inconclusive, thus justifying pluralism.  
3 The concept of methodological pluralism has been misunderstood by Spash (2012). As explained in 
the previous section, it does not mean accepting all methodological positions, but rather not rejecting 
them on a priori grounds. Acceptance of all is a logically incoherent definition by which other forms of 
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pluralism, including value pluralism (Spash, 2008, 2009), can also be easily rejected. Pluralism neither 
means accepting nor rejecting something. Non-rejection is a plausible definition in the face of 
knowledge uncertainties and is a precondition for developing mutual understanding and respect in the 
spirit of value pluralism.  
